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巴西经济学家:控支出不等于拆社保,债务占GDP达82.93%

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Economists say fiscal discipline can coexist with social protection

巴西经济学家在《Valor》采访中表示,控制强制性支出增长是财政整顿的关键,但这与保留宪法保障的社会安全网并不矛盾。

巴西《Valor》报采访的多位经济学家表示,控制巴西公共财政需要放缓强制性支出的增长,但这并不意味着拆解宪法保障的社会安全网;相反,财政整顿对长期维持社会项目至关重要。报道同时给出数据:2025年9月巴西广义政府总债务占GDP比重达82.93%,较上年同期上升5.09个百分点。

这一组报道以「虚假两难」为系列主题,首篇探讨巴西如何在财政责任与减贫之间取得平衡,后续将涉及社会保护项目的可持续性、特权问题和公共部门效率,以及不平等对生产率的影响等。

Inter首席经济学家拉斐拉·维多利亚(Rafaela Vitória)表示,不受控制的公共支出会推高通胀,而通胀对低收入家庭打击最大;她称通胀目前并未失控,但家庭正为维持低通胀承受高利率和债务负担,因此财政纪律是间接的社会福利。

LCA董事、瓦加斯基金会巴西经济研究所(FGV Ibre)研究员布劳利奥·博尔赫斯(Bráulio Borges)警告,长期财政不稳定最终可能迫使政府印钞偿债,导致货币贬值和通胀上升,而「通胀税是累退的」。

在具体路径上,经济学家提出的方案与阿根廷总统哈维尔·米莱(Javier Milei)2024年的大幅削减初级支出不同,重点之一是调整最低工资政策:在保留购买力的前提下,允许最低工资每年实际增长0.5%至1.5%。部分人主张切断最低工资与养老金、社会救助福利之间的自动关联;其他建议包括取消卫生和教育支出与政府收入的自动挂钩、对总支出设定有效上限、打击欺诈、减少社会项目重叠。

博尔赫斯以卢拉首任政府为例,称卢拉2003年上任时将初级财政盈余目标从3.75%提高至4.25%,同时创建了「家庭补助金」(Bolsa Família)项目,说明财政政策与社会政策并不互斥。

Insper前校长、卢拉首任期内经济政策秘书马科斯·里斯本(Marcos Lisboa)指出,宪法和法律限制使大幅削减主要支出类别十分困难:工资和养老金不能下调,养老金、卫生和教育支出各有调整公式和与收入挂钩的要求,因此放缓支出增长是更可行的选项,但他也支持取消这些自动挂钩。

Oriz创始合伙人卡洛斯·卡瓦尔(Carlos Kawall)表示,没有总统候选人主张立即削减相当于GDP 2%至3%的福利,目前提议的是遏制社会支出增长、使其占GDP比重不再上升,并修改指数化规则,以便在五年内使公共债务走上稳定轨道。

债务方面,央行数据显示,2025年9月广义政府总债务占GDP 82.93%,2022年12月为71.68%;12个月名义赤字2025年9月达GDP的9.5%,2022年12月为4.6%。央行货币政策委员会最近一次会议将Selic基准利率维持在13.75%,中断了此前的宽松周期。

BTG Pactual经济学家、FGV Ibre研究员萨穆埃尔·佩索阿(Samuel Pessôa)称,实际基准利率达每年8%的经济体不能被视为健康;若不降息将进入危机,而强行让央行降息则通胀会回归。他支持最低工资每年实际增长0.5%,称这是过去40年劳动生产率的平均增速,并指出自1995年以来最低工资实际上涨195%,而劳动生产率仅增长22%。

独立财政机构(IFI)报告显示,2025年养老金支出总计1.03万亿雷亚尔,社会救助项目「连续现金福利」(BPC)支出达1272亿雷亚尔,两者合计占GDP的9.1%、占中央政府初级支出的48.2%;2027年预算提案预计两者合计占GDP的9.2%。

社会流动性与发展研究所(IMDS)研究主任费尔南多·韦洛索(Fernando Veloso)指出,现行规则下最低工资实际上调会自动抬高养老金和BPC等福利的下限,使在职者加薪也推高相当一部分联邦支出,这种安排在其它国家没有先例。他建议最低工资按IPCA通胀调整、实际增益仅与劳动生产率挂钩,养老金则按通胀加实际增长调整、不必与最低工资一致。

ARX首席经济学家加布里埃尔·莱亚尔·德·巴罗斯(Gabriel Leal de Barros)同样支持最低工资每年实际增长0.5%,但认为最佳方案是切断最低工资与养老金、社会救助支出的关联,即便需要政府投入政治资本推动宪法修正案;他称这对市场预期的影响巨大,将改变公共财政轨迹、收益率曲线和财政部借贷成本,目标是「在实际层面没有任何损失」地保留福利购买力。

在支出挂钩方面,经济学家还建议将卫生最低支出要求与总支出上限对齐、联邦对基础教育维持与发展基金(Fundeb)的出资仅按通胀调整(理由是与学龄人口下降相适应),并审查国会 earmarks 和联邦区宪法基金(FCDF)等与收入挂钩的支出。博尔赫斯称,这些支出挂钩调整加上最低工资政策将占「减支方案的70%」,他认为将最低工资年实际增幅限制在1%至1.5%是「可行的」。

在社会项目效率方面,韦洛索主张以减贫效果而非支出金额衡量成效,称「家庭补助金」是国际认可的低成本反贫项目,但疫情以来其定向性有所恶化,他批评疫情期间「巴西援助」(Auxílio Brasil)600雷亚尔给付起引入的每户最低福利,加上单人受助家庭增加,削弱了给付随家庭收入和构成变化的程度。巴罗斯认为需重新设计社会项目以消除福利重叠和欺诈,估计每项措施每年可节省250亿至300亿雷亚尔。

收入措施方面,佩索阿列举了对目前免税证券征税、减少个人所得税中卫生和教育扣除等税收支出、对「简易税制」(Simples)和推定利润制等特殊税制企业分配的股息征税等可能。经济学家承认收入措施也有帮助,但额外收入在抵消更高支出的同时对抑制总需求作用有限;佩索阿还提醒,为最低工资2%实际增长而加税并非最佳做法,因为最低工资领取者几乎会把额外收入全部花掉,使通胀和利率维持高位。

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Economists say fiscal discipline can coexist with social protection

Rafaela Vitória Washington Alves/Valor Bringing Brazil’s public finances under control will require slowing the growth of mandatory spending, but economists interviewed by Valor say that does not mean dismantling the social safety net guaranteed by the Constitution. Rather, fiscal consolidation is essential to preserving social programs over the long term and ensuring the government has resources to respond to emergencies. This is the first article in "False Dilemma", a series exploring how Brazil can reconcile fiscal responsibility with efforts to reduce inequality. The reports will examine the challenges of keeping social protection programs sustainable, tackling privileges and improving public-sector efficiency. Other articles will explore the economic costs of inequality, including its impact on productivity, as well as indicators of violence in Brazil, among other issues. Unchecked public spending can fuel inflation, which hits low-income households hardest, said Rafaela Vitória, chief economist at Inter. “Inflation is not out of control today, but we are paying the price of high interest rates to keep it low. Households are burdened with debt because of this. Fiscal discipline matters because it helps improve the well-being of low-income people. It is an indirect form of social welfare.” Lula’s actual Finance minister Tax reform raises concerns over revenue-driven fiscal policy Under pressure, Lula calls for fiscal responsibility to draw foreign capital Bráulio Borges, a director at LCA and researcher at the Brazilian Economics Institute of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV Ibre), warned that prolonged fiscal instability could ultimately force the government to print money to service its debt. “That results in too much money circulating in the economy, the currency depreciates and inflation rises. And the inflation tax is regressive.” The proposals for curbing spending growth bear little resemblance to the sweeping cuts to primary expenditure imposed by Argentine President Javier Milei in 2024. Instead, economists point to changes in Brazil’s minimum wage policy as one of the most important steps toward fiscal consolidation. Their proposals would preserve purchasing power while allowing annual increases of between 0.5% and 1.5% above inflation. Some argue that the best approach would be to sever the link between the minimum wage and pension and social assistance benefits. Other recommendations include ending the automatic link between health and education spending and government revenue, imposing an effective ceiling on total expenditure, eliminating fraud and reducing overlap among social programs. Although the economists differ on how these changes should be implemented, they agree that fiscal responsibility and social protection are not mutually exclusive. Borges pointed to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s first administration as evidence. “When he took office in 2003, he raised the primary surplus target from 3.75% to 4.25% and created [cash-transfer program] Bolsa Família. That shows there is no incompatibility between fiscal and social policies.” Marcos Lisboa, former president of Insper and economic policy secretary during Lula’s first term, said constitutional and legal restrictions make substantial cuts to major spending categories difficult. Wages and pensions cannot be reduced, while pension, health and education spending are subject to their own adjustment formulas and revenue-linked requirements. Slowing expenditure growth is therefore the more viable option, although Lisboa also favors removing those automatic links. Carlos Kawall, founding partner of Oriz, noted that no presidential candidate had advocated a draconian fiscal policy involving an immediate reduction in benefits equivalent to 2% or 3% of GDP. “What is being proposed is a policy to contain the growth of social spending, keeping that expenditure from rising as a share of GDP, and changing indexation rules so that, within five years, we can put public debt on a path toward stabilization. That signal would bring interest rates down and prevent the crisis we could face if we stick to the cosmetic measures suggested so far.” Debt pressures Economists warn that Brazil’s current debt burden and the pace at which it is growing are unsustainable. Central Bank data show that gross general government debt reached 82.93% of GDP in September, up 5.09 percentage points from a year earlier. In December 2022, the ratio stood at 71.68%. The 12-month nominal deficit reached 9.5% of GDP in September, compared with 4.6% in December 2022, reflecting the burden of high interest rates. At its most recent meeting, the Central Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (Copom) held the benchmark Selic rate at 13.75%, interrupting its previous easing cycle. Samuel Pessôa, an economist at BTG Pactual and researcher at FGV Ibre, said an economy operating with a real benchmark interest rate of 8% a year cannot be considered healthy. “The Brazilian economy is sick. Unless we bring interest rates down, we will enter a crisis. No economy can withstand interest rates this high for very long. And if we force the Central Bank to cut rates, inflation will return. We have done that before.” Economists say stabilizing public finances will require slower spending growth, including on pensions and social assistance, given their weight in the federal budget. A report by the Independent Fiscal Institution (IFI) shows that pension benefits totaled R$1.03 trillion in 2025, while spending on the Continuous Cash Benefit (BPC), a social assistance program, reached R$127.2 billion. Together, the two programs accounted for 9.1% of GDP and 48.2% of central government primary expenditure. The proposed 2027 budget projects combined spending of 9.2% of GDP. “The debate is not about whether social protection should be maintained. It is about how quickly that protection should improve. I support a 0.5% annual real increase in the minimum wage. That was the average growth rate of labor productivity over the past 40 years,” Pessôa said. Productivity, he explained, determines the pace at which resources expand in the economy. “Some advocate a 2% real increase, but that is incompatible with what the economy can deliver.” Since 1995, the minimum wage has risen 195% in real terms, while labor productivity has increased just 22%, he said. Minimum wage reform Under current rules, real increases in the minimum wage automatically raise the floor for pensions and social assistance benefits such as the BPC. As a result, pay increases for active workers also drive up a substantial portion of federal spending. Fernando Veloso, research director at the Institute for Social Mobility and Development (IMDS), said this arrangement has no parallel in other countries, where pension adjustments generally aim only to preserve purchasing power. Brazil’s current formula adjusts the minimum wage for inflation plus GDP growth, subject to a cap of 2% on real gains. Veloso argues that linking benefits to the minimum wage makes wage increases more expensive for the government and complicates spending control. He proposes adjusting the minimum wage for inflation, as measured by the IPCA consumer price index, with real gains tied exclusively to labor productivity. Pensions, meanwhile, would receive inflation adjustments plus a real increase that would not necessarily match the minimum wage. Gabriel Leal de Barros, chief economist at ARX, also supports real minimum wage increases of 0.5% a year, reflecting productivity growth. But he believes the best solution is to eliminate the link between the minimum wage and pension and social assistance spending, even if doing so requires the government to invest political capital in a constitutional amendment. “We need to cut that umbilical cord. It is worth the effort because the impact on market expectations would be enormous. It would radically change the trajectory of public finances, affecting the yield curve and the Treasury’s borrowing costs.” The goal, Barros emphasized, is to preserve the purchasing power of pension and social assistance benefits, “without any loss in real terms.” Fabio Giambiagi, also a researcher at FGV Ibre, proposes creating a separate national wage floor for the labor market. Initially set at the same level as the minimum wage, it would subsequently increase at a faster pace, without automatically passing the full adjustment on to minimum pension benefits. The arrangement would allow wages for active workers to continue rising in real terms while limiting the impact on pension spending. “This is not a squeeze on retirees. A squeeze means a reduction,” Giambiagi said. “The minimum wage and the pension floor would continue to rise, but the increase would be larger in the labor market.” Giambiagi also advocates freezing spending growth in real terms in 2027, the first year of Lula’s fourth term, followed by a rule limiting annual increases to inflation plus 1.5%. He stressed that the proposal is fundamentally different from an abrupt spending-cutting program. “Milei reduced Argentina’s primary spending by 27% in real terms in 2024. In Brazil, that would not only be unworkable but an aberration,” he said. For Giambiagi, a commitment to zero real spending growth in the first year would provide an opportunity to put public finances in order and signal a change in fiscal direction, without triggering a contraction comparable to Argentina’s. Budget rigidity Beyond minimum wage reform, economists broadly agree that Brazil’s current fiscal framework has lost coherence because its overall spending ceiling coexists with expenditure commitments linked to revenue growth, particularly in health and education. As a result, measures designed to boost tax revenue also increase some mandatory expenses, which account for more than 90% of spending in an already highly rigid budget. The government has also introduced mechanisms allowing certain expenditures to be excluded from the fiscal rules, further weakening the framework’s ability to restrain total spending. For health care, Giambiagi proposes aligning the minimum spending requirement with the overall expenditure ceiling. In other words, mandatory health spending would follow the same adjustment formula as the fiscal framework. The government could still allocate additional resources to the sector, but those funds would have to compete with other budget priorities. In education, Giambiagi recommends adjusting federal contributions to the Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education (Fundeb) by inflation alone. His argument is that Brazil’s school-age population is shrinking because of demographic changes, making it possible to increase spending per student in real terms even if total funding remains constant after inflation. Barros said reforms to health and education spending must involve not only the federal government but also states and municipalities. Borges noted that congressional earmarks and spending through the Federal District Constitutional Fund (FCDF) are also linked to revenue and should be reviewed. Together, changes to those spending links and the minimum wage policy would account for “70% of the spending-reduction package,” he said. Borges considers limiting annual real minimum wage increases to between 1% and 1.5% “feasible.” Braulio Borges Anna Carolina Negri/Valor Social program efficiency Alongside efforts to restrain expenditure growth, economists advocate improving the design and targeting of social programs. Veloso argues that their success should be measured by how effectively they reduce poverty, rather than by the amount of money spent. He described Bolsa Família as an internationally recognized anti-poverty program that delivers results at a relatively low cost. But he believes its targeting has deteriorated since the pandemic. Bolsa Família recipients drive most formal job creation, study finds One of his main criticisms concerns the introduction of a minimum benefit per family, dating back to the R$600 payments under "Auxílio Brasil" during the pandemic. Combined with an increase in single-person households receiving benefits, the policy has reduced the extent to which payments vary according to family income and household composition. Barros also sees a need to redesign social programs to eliminate overlapping benefits and combat fraud. He estimates that each of these measures could potentially save between R$25 billion and R$30 billion a year. Revenue measures Pessôa cited several possibilities, including taxing currently exempt securities, reducing tax expenditures such as personal income tax deductions for health and education, and taxing dividends distributed by companies operating under special tax regimes, including Simples and the presumed-profit system. While economists agree that fiscal consolidation must focus primarily on slowing spending growth, they acknowledge that revenue measures could also help. Although the additional revenue would offset the higher spending and prevent the fiscal deficit from worsening, it would do little to contain aggregate demand. He cautioned, however, that raising taxes to finance a 2% real increase in the minimum wage would not be the best approach. That is because minimum wage recipients tend to spend virtually all their additional income, sustaining pressure on the economy. Inflation and interest rates would therefore remain elevated.

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