卢拉连任后巴西被右翼邻国包围，专家称应走务实共存路线

South America’s geopolitical map is taking shape around one of the most heterogeneous configurations seen in decades. With President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s re-election, alongside left-wing and center-left governments in Uruguay and the Guianas, a picture is emerging in which Brazil operates as a kind of “island” surrounded by a powerful “blue wave”—a belt of right-wing and far-right governments that includes Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia. Venezuela remains under strong U.S. influence following the capture of Nicolás Maduro in January 2026. U.S. government helped Flávio Bolsonaro flee Brazil Opposition to Milei demands answers on possible aid to Flávio Future of Brazil-U.S. relationship is uncertain, experts say Despite ideological polarization and the rhetoric of certain regional leaders, such as Argentine President Javier Milei, South America’s geopolitical dynamics point toward pragmatic coexistence. Amid intensifying competition for hegemony between the U.S. and China, the specter of an American neo-Monroe Doctrine and transnational challenges such as organized crime, economic and trade interests are emerging as the continent’s main unifying forces, according to experts interviewed by Valor. Former Ambassador Roberto Jaguaribe, an advisory board member of the Brazilian Center for International Relations (Cebri), says Washington’s approach to Latin America has once again been shaped by a defensive alignment against China’s growing presence in the region. Under the shadow of a resurgence of principles akin to the Monroe Doctrine, created in the 19th century to keep foreign powers out and consolidate U.S. hegemony on the continent, the U.S. government has sought to rebuild its sphere of direct influence in the Southern Hemisphere through elections. Another tangible expression of this strategy, Jaguaribe notes, is the Shield of the Americas project, a defense and security cooperation initiative for ideologically aligned governments in the region. “I see a complex scenario. But Brazil is the most important country in South America. We matter to everyone. That is an asset, even though the other South American nations also matter to us,” Jaguaribe says. “Undoubtedly, central relationships need to improve, with greater regional integration. But not on an ideological basis. Ideology is the enemy of understanding. These negotiations must involve everyone, including border communities,” the former ambassador says. “For Brazil, in addition to this integration, it will be important to maintain good relations with the U.S. and diversify its markets. A strong Europe can contribute to greater trade dynamism, since Europeans have capital, knowledge and global expertise.” For Leonardo Trevisan, a professor of international relations at ESPM, the prompt congratulations sent to President Lula by governments across the region, including emphatic statements from even conservative leaders, are positive signs. In his assessment, they reflect a concern with maintaining economic pragmatism and preserving diplomatic relations with Brazil, as well as the expectation that Democrats will win a majority in the U.S. midterm elections, which would make the country less inclined to engage in any kind of confrontation with the Lula government. Trevisan Reprodução YouTube Trevisan cautions, however, that deep integration at this point is likely to run up against structural problems, both in Brazil and in the “blue wave” (right-wing) countries. He cites Chile as an example, where President José Kast, seven months into his term, faces disapproval ratings above 60% amid difficulties controlling inflation and fulfilling campaign promises. “It is not in anyone’s interest to heighten tensions. Brazil carries significant weight for these countries, and the domestic and external circumstances are not favorable.” As for bilateral relations with Argentina, both Jaguaribe and Trevisan agree that diplomatic friction should not take precedence over strategic and commercial interests. According to the former ambassador, Milei’s stance carries the heavy rhetoric of a government that has become politically worn down. The insults, he says, are damaging, but Brazil and Argentina are “inevitable and indispensable partners.” This institutional and commercial resilience in the face of local political swings is underscored by Gonzalo Müller, a political science professor at Universidad del Desarrollo (UDD) in Chile. In his view, Lula’s re-election consolidates a dynamic of accommodation that was already underway. “It sent a signal of continuity. Let us remember that the other changes have already taken place in the other countries. Therefore, this pragmatic coexistence is already happening,” he argues. In Müller’s view, pragmatism reflects an effort to strike a balance between Washington and Beijing. “China sees Lula’s election as a relief, but all countries are seeking this balance. China is the relevant trade partner, and the U.S. is the security ally. In the economy and free trade, China drives things forward; in defense, it is the Americans,” he says. He notes that this convergence keeps regional projects intact. “Logistical integration does not depend on whichever governments happen to be in office, because none of them—Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, or Brazil—has an anti-integration agenda.” Nico Pose, a professor in the International Studies Program at Udelar in Uruguay, says that for most South American nations, choosing between China and the U.S. is neither a viable nor a desirable option, since automatically aligning with one or the other brings more costs than benefits. “While Beijing has established itself as the leading trade partner, a buyer of commodities and a source of infrastructure financing, Washington remains an indispensable partner in defense, direct investment and security,” he says. In addition, the Udelar professor stresses that Lula’s victory offers neighboring countries such as Uruguay an important buffer and greater room for maneuver in the face of U.S. pressure. Pose and Müller identify the fight against transnational organized crime as the main point of tension on the regional agenda. In their view, the participation of conservative governments in U.S. security initiatives contrasts with Lula’s position, as he has refused to bring Brazil into the Shield of the Americas program. Müller warns that the issue is a sensitive one for the future, although he notes that, at the operational level, police forces are already coordinating their efforts against transnational crime. Pose emphasizes that cooperation will succeed only if it remains strictly technical and operational. “If it turns into a political-ideological dispute or is subject to external interference, trust between countries will be eroded, drastically reducing the effectiveness of actions across the continent,” he warns.