巴西报复美国关税恐自伤，中资企业需关注谈判筹码转向

Sandra Rios Leo Pinheiro/Valor Retaliating against the U.S. in response to the 25% tariffs imposed by the Trump administration would amount to “shooting ourselves in the foot,” says economist Sandra Rios, director of the Center for Integration and Development Studies (Cindes). U.S. tariffs hit $11bn in exports, deepen Brazil trade slump U.S. tariffs raise competitiveness fears for Brazilian industry Trump tariffs ignite blame game in presidential race After the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced new tariffs on Brazilian products Wednesday (15) night, the Brazilian government signaled it could invoke the Reciprocity Law, passed in 2025, in response. Rios is skeptical of that approach. “Invoking the Reciprocity Law would have more of a domestic political effect than a practical one. I don’t think it would improve the environment for bilateral negotiations.” In her view, Brazil has few options in its bilateral relationship with the United States, and the high uncertainty surrounding trade with Washington is likely to persist for the duration of the Trump administration. That doesn’t mean Brazil should sit idle, though—she argues the country should keep negotiating. There is still room to pursue exemptions for certain products, even though Brazilian and American companies have already made such attempts during the USTR proceedings. Rios also suggests one viable negotiating strategy would be for Brazil to lower its own import tariffs. “Brazil should only adopt measures that benefit its own economy. One example would be cutting tariffs on certain capital goods—Brazil’s tariffs on these are among the highest in the world, and lowering them could benefit the country while doubling as a negotiating chip,” she says. She believes government support for affected companies could help but says a more important step would be investing in new-market development and export diversification rather than expanding financing programs—an effort she says should involve ApexBrasil, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services. Below are the main excerpts from her interview with Valor: Valor: Now that the new U.S. tariffs have been confirmed, what options does Brazil have? Sandra Rios: Brazil has very few options in its bilateral relationship with the United States. Continuing to negotiate is one path, but without any expectation that the tariffs will be fully reversed. Signs that this tariff scenario would become entrenched were already visible from the start of Trump’s new term, and the political climate between Brazil and the U.S. hasn’t favored a different outcome. My sense is that the major adjustments to the tariff package have already been made—the USTR identified which products would do the most damage to the U.S. market if tariffs were applied. From here, the trend will be toward targeted tweaks. I don’t think Brazil should do anything that amounts to shooting itself in the foot. Invoking the Reciprocity Law would have more of a domestic political effect than a practical one. I don’t think it would improve the environment for bilateral negotiations. This has always been a challenge for Brazil. Back in 2002, when the U.S. imposed safeguard measures on steel, there was talk of retaliation, but Brazil always struggled to figure out what to retaliate against and how to do it in a way that would actually hit U.S. interests without hurting our own economy. Valor: So retaliation isn’t the way to go? Rios: Cross-retaliation involving intellectual property comes up often, but that would also be shooting ourselves in the foot, since it would damage our own business environment. Brazil should only adopt measures that benefit its own economy. One example would be cutting tariffs on certain capital goods—Brazil’s tariffs on these are among the highest in the world, and lowering them could benefit the country while doubling as a negotiating chip. I think Brazil needs to think about what it could offer in negotiations that would interest the U.S. without hurting itself. If Brazil raises tariffs on something the U.S. doesn’t much care about—alcoholic beverages, say—the impact is negligible. But raising tariffs on important goods like electronics, capital equipment, machinery, or pharmaceuticals ends up hurting our own economy and society. So Brazil should stick to measures that benefit the country too. Valor: Abimaq has said it will keep working with Brazilian and U.S. authorities to secure exemptions, but it hasn’t floated unilateral tariff cuts as a negotiating tool the way you have. Rios: Industry associations like Abimaq tend to resist trade liberalization—the same happens in sectors like ethanol. There will always be industries that would rather keep their tariff protection. But if everyone resists any form of opening, Brazil ends up with no negotiating tools left. Valor: What is Brazil’s average import tariff? Rios: The average tariff on capital goods is around 14%. Across the economy as a whole, the average applied tariff runs about 12% to 13%. It’s worth distinguishing that from Brazil’s bound tariff at the WTO—the maximum rate the country is allowed to apply. For most industrial goods, that ceiling is 35%. Valor: Should Brazil take this to the WTO? Rios: Brazil should use every tool available that doesn’t work against its own interests. Filing a case through the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism matters as a show of commitment to international trade rules. In practice, though, it’s unlikely to produce concrete results, since the WTO’s Appellate Body has been paralyzed ever since the U.S. blocked the appointment of new judges. Even so, opening a dispute reinforces Brazil’s stance in defense of the multilateral trading system. At this point, going to the WTO is much more about signaling a political position and defending trade rules than actually reversing the tariffs. Valor: What other strategies should Brazil pursue? Rios: We have to accept that uncertainty in trade with the United States is here to stay—that’s a defining feature of this administration. So we need to look for other markets. For more sophisticated manufactured goods—capital equipment, footwear, apparel, consumer goods—that’s harder than it is for commodities, which are more standardized. Finding new markets for manufactured products and adapting brands and design to local consumer preferences takes time. But it’s essential, because we don’t know what’s coming. Our relationship with the U.S. is dominated by uncertainty. Valor: Is there still room for Brazilian and U.S. companies to push for further exemptions? Rios: As I understand it, there was a formal comment period this time before the decision was made. Brazil’s private sector actively took part in public hearings in the U.S. and coordinated with American customers, who also submitted their own arguments. Unlike the first round of tariffs in 2025, when mobilization only happened after the measures were already announced, this time there was an effort to shape the process beforehand. Brazilian companies may still be able to work with their American partners to pursue exemptions for products still subject to the tariffs. Valor: Is there a possibility of challenging the measures in court? Rios: Some sectors have floated turning to U.S. courts. There are questions around the investigation itself—including allegations tied to Brazilian trade practices, Pix, and preferential trade agreements—that could potentially be challenged judicially. That’s a possible path, but an expensive one. Brazilian companies and industry associations will have to weigh those costs and fund the litigation with no guarantee of success. Valor: Should the Brazilian government offer financial support to the affected sectors, as it has before? Rios: Some domestic policy support for affected sectors matters, and that happened during the first round of tariffs with the launch of the Brazil Sovereign Plan. But I think it’s more promising to invest in opening new markets and diversifying exports than in financing programs. Under the first version of the Sovereign Plan, many companies struggled to access funding because the credit lines came with conditions like no layoffs—which in practice limited participation. What matters more is encouraging productivity gains and helping companies break into new markets. Valor: Who should lead this diversification push? Rios: It has to be a joint effort. ApexBrasil handles trade promotion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs leads trade negotiations, and the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade, and Services also plays an important role. There’s still a lot of work to do at home, too—we need to advance on regulatory convergence, technical standards, and adopting international norms to make it easier for Brazilian products to reach other markets.