巴西2027年1.8万亿雷亚尔到期墙逼近，在巴中资企业融资成本承压

David Beker Nilani Goettems/Valor Managing Brazil’s public debt has become an increasingly difficult task for the National Treasury. While the government is not yet having trouble funding itself, the high interest rates demanded by investors, a maturity wall of nearly R$1.8 trillion in 2027 and the growing concentration of debt in Selic base rate-linked securities are starting to raise concerns in the market. The backdrop has heightened the sense of urgency around fiscal consolidation proposals and fueled fears that the Treasury could miss another opportunity to improve the debt mix, with R$1.1 trillion in Selic-linked securities coming due next year. “The floating-rate share of the debt has been gaining weight and is now very close to 50%. The last time we saw floating-rate debt at such high levels was two decades ago, and this is obviously happening at a time of very high interest rates,” said Roberto Secemski, Barclays’ chief Brazil economist, who described the current composition as a source of “concern.” He noted that gross debt now stands at 82% of GDP, compared with about 55% 20 years ago. Structural primary deficit doubles to 1.4% of GDP, IFI says Brazil’s next government faces growing urgency to tackle fiscal woes Brazilian assets reflect ‘hybrid world that doesn’t exist,’ Galapagos says “With rates high and no prospect of a sustained decline, we have an even bigger problem precisely because this aggravates the debt burden,” he said. Secemski said the fiscal picture is now worse than at the end of 2024, when domestic markets came under significant stress and concerns about fiscal dominance entered the debate. One factor at the time was the already large share of floating-rate debt. The starting point today, however, is weaker. At the end of 2024, gross debt was around 77% of GDP and the Selic policy rate stood at 10.5%. The deterioration in the macroeconomic backdrop is fueling the sense of urgency among market participants, particularly as the floating-rate share of the debt has risen sharply. Markets have already endured bouts of turbulence this year in both fixed-rate securities (LTNs and NTN-Fs) and inflation-linked bonds (NTN-Bs), with some offerings suffering from a lack of demand. Over the 12 months since its launch, Intraday, Valor’s markets blog, has chronicled several episodes that put debt management in the spotlight: from euphoria over the Treasury’s shift in strategy following Daniel Leal’s arrival, to concerns surrounding the giant off-the-run NTN-B auction, the record intervention amid the war in Iran and stress in NTN-Bs, followed more recently by shorter duration and a preference for LFTs. “The debt profile is deteriorating,” said David Beker, Bank of America’s head of Brazil economics and LatAm Equity Strategy. “The government is issuing fewer fixed-rate bonds and fewer NTN-Bs and leaning more heavily on LFTs. In the extreme, if the Central Bank needs to raise interest rates, the debt feels the impact immediately. Over the long run, at some point it would be good for Brazil to return to fixing a larger share of its debt, but what could help that process is greater fiscal credibility. That is a discussion for the next government, regardless of who wins.” 2027 maturity wall The scale of the Treasury’s challenge next year can be expressed in numbers: of the R$1.8 trillion coming due in 2027, slightly more than half matures in the first six months. Selic-linked securities, or LFTs, account for nearly 60% of total maturities. Without a swift fiscal adjustment, investors fear the Treasury may be able to fund itself only through floating-rate securities, missing the opportunity to improve the debt mix. Lula team weighs separate minimum-wage and benefit increases “LFT maturities are very large, and that obviously creates some opportunities. With so much of this debt coming due, an obvious goal would be to improve the debt profile by replacing floating-rate securities with fixed-rate bonds and NTN-Bs. The big challenge would be for the Treasury to lower costs, increase duration and improve the debt profile without putting too much pressure on the market,” said André Caetano, head of fixed-income and quantitative funds at Bradesco Asset Management. “I am convinced that, whatever the new government—continuity or change—some adjustment will have to be made. That is non-negotiable. And, of course, the greater the willingness to send those signals quickly, the better for the Treasury,” he said. Rollover options If market conditions remain unfavorable, the Treasury would have fewer—and less attractive—options for rolling over the debt. The simplest would be to replace maturing LFTs with newly issued LFTs. It could also seek to increase issuance of short-term fixed-rate securities. “Nominal interest rates in Brazil are very high, close to their highest levels of the past 10 years, with an average rate of around 14.4%. If you are going to switch into LTNs in this environment, it is better for them to be short-term, because you would not carry that cost for as long. The yield curve is at very high levels and slopes upward. Issuing longer-dated securities means locking in something more expensive for a long time. It would be a delicate choice. Would it be worth increasing duration at the expense of the average rate?” Caetano said. Still, Caetano sees no imminent risk to debt rollover, noting that the Treasury’s liquidity cushion is sufficient to cover slightly more than eight months. Beker shares that assessment. Depending on market conditions, he said, the Treasury can buy back securities or skip an auction, as it has already done in 2026. Still, he noted that market sentiment has been deteriorating as investors face rising debt and interest expenses that are high both in absolute terms and relative to other countries. “Something has to be done. Our nominal deficit and interest expenses are very high. Debt is rising, so we are getting increasingly close to fiscal dominance. It is very difficult to know when you are actually in that situation, but to avoid getting there, we need to tackle the problem and restore credibility to the fiscal accounts,” Beker said. Fiscal dominance Fiscal dominance occurs when public finances deteriorate to such an extent that monetary policy becomes ineffective in controlling inflation. Under such conditions, interest-rate increases can even become counterproductive. One positive sign, Beker said, is that teams advising the two leading presidential candidates have been raising the fiscal issue. Since late July and early August, Finance Minister Dario Durigan has been meeting with investors. Members of Flávio Bolsonaro’s (Liberal Party) team have likewise been visiting São Paulo’s Faria Lima financial district. “We have seen the minister [Dario Durigan] meeting with the market, and we have also heard more proposals from Flávio Bolsonaro’s side. It is an issue that is on the radar and apparently considered important by the candidates. And as fiscal credibility improves, interest rates fall and appetite to extend duration increases,” he said. Election window Secemski has a similar assessment but points to important risks, recalling the turmoil of 2024, when the real weakened to R$6.3 per dollar at the worst point and the yield curve priced in a Selic rate of as much as 17%. He does not rule out a return to an adverse market environment, although he said the election outcome and external conditions will determine how far asset prices deteriorate—or improve. Flávio Bolsonaro bolsters team drafting government plan “At the end of 2024, there was a period of intense anxiety while markets waited for announcements, because the opportunity window was already seen as likely to be narrow. Now, with the elections approaching, an adjustment cycle requires measures to be taken as soon as possible, since the elected candidate’s ‘honeymoon’ is likely to be short-lived, limiting both the timing and room for action,” he said. Secemski also noted that, in a scenario in which President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is reelected, investors would likely demand prompt adjustment measures because, politically, a second term would effectively begin on Oct. 26 rather than Jan. 5. Depending on the market reaction, Secemski also warned about the trajectory of the Treasury’s liquidity cushion given the heavy debt maturities next year. “This deserves attention. Ideally, the current situation should not persist, especially because during the pandemic we saw an episode in which the Central Bank had to transfer R$325 billion in profits from its foreign-exchange reserves to the Treasury. We do not see that happening again, but it is best to avoid challenging situations like the current one in debt management. That is why the timing of the fiscal adjustment is so important.”