Rabobank预警：财政刺激推高巴西2026通胀，中资企业需关注利率与汇率风险

Maurício Une Keiny Andrade/Valor Between supply shocks from oil prices and the effects of El Niño, government fiscal stimulus is adding to inflationary pressure in 2026, says Mauricio Une, Rabobank’s chief economist for South America. Given this backdrop, he expects the Central Bank to take a cautious approach, cutting the benchmark Selic rate just once more this year, to 14%, before holding steady until mid-April 2027. As a result, he isn’t forecasting much of a rebound in GDP growth next year—Rabobank projects 2.2% for 2027. Oil jump pressures Brazilian assets NTN-Bs struggle to find buyers despite 8% yields El Niño raises inflation risks, Morgan Stanley say His macro outlook for 2026 also calls for the U.S. dollar to strengthen in the second half of the year, driven by the uncertainty that typically accompanies election periods as well as expectations of progress in U.S.-Iran talks, which tend to boost the dollar. Still, he expects the Brazilian real to recover once the election period passes. Une argues that the coming year should focus on renewing fiscal adjustment efforts to put public debt on a downward path. Whoever wins the presidential election, he says, the incoming administration will need to spend its political capital negotiating a new fiscal framework with Congress and society. “Revenue and spending need to be rebalanced so the country can bring down not just the primary deficit but the nominal deficit too. That could eventually let Brazil settle into a meaningfully lower neutral interest rate than it has today.” He adds that fiscal discipline needs to go hand in hand with reviving Brazil’s economic reform agenda—something he says could help unlock the country’s chronically weak productivity and make it more attractive to foreign investors. Highlights from the interview below: GDP dynamics Domestic demand has stayed fairly resilient, buoyed by the fiscal stimulus seen in the first quarter as well as quasi-fiscal measures. Even so, the economy is losing steam after growing 3.5% at the end of 2024, weighed down by a prolonged stretch of tight monetary policy. Rabobank expects GDP growth of around 1.8% in 2026 and 2.2% in 2027—a marked slowdown from 2024’s pace. Supply and demand shocks We’re seeing supply shocks layering on top of demand shocks tied to fiscal policy. The oil-related shocks should ease by the fourth quarter, but that’s right when El Niño is expected to hit—international models put the odds of a very strong El Niño in November and December at over 60%. That means the inflation outlook looks difficult for now, even as current readings already reflect these pressures heavily. A perfect storm Food inflation is likely to top 7% year-over-year in early 2027—a perfect storm driven by El Niño. Our models put headline inflation at 5.1% by the end of 2026. Those pressures should ease gradually, especially on food, with inflation trending back toward 4.3% from March onward and ending 2027 at 4.1%. Is inflation a concern? Yes and no. If inflation closed out 2025 at 4.3% and climbs back to 5.1% by the end of 2026, that’s certainly worth worrying about. That said, this oil shock echoes what we saw in 2022 during the Russia-Ukraine war, but inflation back then was much higher to begin with—2022 opened with inflation having ended 2021 at 10%. There was also heavy fiscal stimulus and looser credit conditions throughout 2022, both in Brazil and globally, on top of supply constraints from pandemic-era logistics disruptions. Interest rates Against this backdrop, we expect the Central Bank to cut the Selic rate to 14% at its next meeting, then hold there through year-end while it monitors the inflation picture. We think policymakers will be reluctant to resume cutting in 2026, partly given the uncertainty around the Strait of Hormuz. When cuts resume The picture should get clearer for the Central Bank starting in April 2027, particularly after March’s IPCA inflation data comes in. At that point, current inflation should be back within the target range, opening the door to further rate cuts—we see the Selic falling to around 12.5% by the end of 2027. Because this easing will happen while policy stays relatively tight overall, we don’t expect a particularly strong GDP rebound in 2027. A stronger fiscal adjustment Whoever wins in October, the next government will need to push through a stronger fiscal adjustment. That means looking hard for ways to cut waste, while making the case to the public that the goal is spending more wisely—not simply spending more. Debt We estimate Brazil will run a nominal deficit of 11% of GDP in 2026, and expect it to stay roughly there next year. That’s a big reason gross public debt is climbing so fast—we project it will hit 83.4% of GDP by year-end and approach 90% over the following two years. To keep attracting investment despite that, interest rates need to stay relatively high, which in turn drags on productivity. Revenue and spending Brazil needs a better balance between revenue and spending—not just a stronger primary balance, but a better mix behind it. Ideally, that improvement should come more from spending discipline than from raising revenue, which would build confidence that gross debt can stabilize around 90% of GDP in the coming years and then start to decline. Revenue and spending need to be rebalanced so the country can bring down not just the primary deficit but the nominal deficit too. That could eventually let Brazil settle into a meaningfully lower neutral interest rate than it has today. Indexation A major obstacle is Brazil’s automatic indexation rules, which make mandatory spending—now over 90% of the federal budget—extremely hard to rein in. Starting in 2027, these mechanisms will need to be recalibrated to slow that growth. Working with Congress Every dollar matters when there’s so little fiscal room to maneuver. That’s exactly why the next political cycle is an opportunity: the incoming administration can use fresh political capital to negotiate with Congress and civil society, rebalancing revenue and spending and putting to rest concerns that public debt is on an unsustainable path—concerns made more urgent by mandatory spending’s growing share of the budget. Public spending needs to get more effective. Congressional budget earmarks would still exist, but ideally as part of a broader, more coordinated effort to prioritize spending across government. It’s a political negotiation that will take real political capital to pull off. The election and the exchange rate The real typically comes under more pressure in the second half of election years, once budget talks for the following year get underway and markets conclude the fiscal adjustment doesn’t go far enough. That usually pushes up the country’s risk premium. It’s also when multinationals repatriate dividends, driving dollar outflows. On top of that, we expect the U.S. and Iran to move toward a deal, easing military tensions and pointing to lower U.S. government spending—both dollar-supportive—along with a more hawkish Fed than expected under a second Trump administration. Altogether, we expect the foreign exchange rate to strengthen regardless of who wins the election, moving toward R$5.35 per dollar in the third and fourth quarters and potentially reaching R$5.45 by year-end. The exchange rate in 2027 From early 2027, international investors could turn their attention back to countries like Brazil—relatively insulated from global political flashpoints, holding the world’s second-largest reserves of rare earths, a strong energy mix, and one of the world’s largest oil industries. Brazil is in the rare position of being able to expand ethanol use while also ramping up oil exports. Add an attractive interest rate differential, and there’s real room for the real to strengthen in the first half of the year. We expect market turbulence to stay largely confined to the election period, with little reason for concern afterward. Sustained growth Brazil’s biggest obstacle to sustained growth is weak productivity, which keeps per capita income from rising fast enough to meet people’s expectations. Income transfer programs have often served as a short-term fix for that shortfall. Productivity Brazil needs to untangle its productivity problem, which means sticking with reforms that improve the business environment and make the country attractive to investors again. Infrastructure investment matters here too, both economically and socially—better sanitation could cut healthcare costs, and better transportation would lower logistics costs while freeing up people’s time, making the workforce more productive. These are the kinds of reforms that need to be back on the agenda in the next political cycle. Oil The U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding remains fragile. Washington wants Iran to stop enriching uranium, hand over its stockpile, and get Hezbollah to stop attacking Israel. Even so, we think the Trump administration has strong reasons to sign—U.S. gasoline prices have climbed sharply ahead of the summer driving season. They hit $5 a gallon back in 2022, and more recently approached $4.50 before easing below $4, though they remain elevated. That matters a lot for the administration, especially with congressional elections approaching and approval ratings sliding—both add pressure to strike a deal with Iran. Oil infrastructure Rabobank sees financial conditions as the main driver of oil prices right now. That said, Iran’s pipeline infrastructure has taken damage, and shipping constraints extend beyond the Strait of Hormuz into the Red Sea—so we’re still watching the physical side of the market closely. Prices could climb again if those bottlenecks become more disruptive.