科克伦称央行独木难支，在巴中资需盯紧巴西财政规则可信度

As global government bond markets appear to have put the growing problem of government debt at the center of attention, one of the leading American economists of his generation has spent more than 30 years studying the role fiscal policy plays in the price dynamics of an economy. John Cochrane, a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, says central banks cannot solve inflation on their own. If they raise interest rates in an economy where there is no confidence that fiscal policy will generate the surpluses needed to back the government’s obligations, monetary authorities may reduce inflation in the short term, but at the risk of causing even higher inflation later. Under the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) developed by Cochrane, an economy’s price level is ultimately determined by the relationship between the government’s nominal debt and the present value of the future fiscal surpluses it will be able to generate. In an interview with Intraday, he draws parallels and points to paths forward for Brazil’s increasingly urgent fiscal debate. Valor: How does the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level differ from the framework used by central banks? John Cochrane: The interesting thing about most central banks is that, first of all, they believe they are fully in charge of inflation. I love Milton Friedman, but you got to remember that in the 1950s and 1960s, people thought central banks had nothing to do with inflation. Inflation was attributed to cost and demand pressures, unions, wage-price spirals. Friedman said, “No, it’s the central banks.” And he won. Now everybody thinks central banks are fully in charge of inflation. Fiscal theory says: not quite. You need fiscal and monetary policy. Valor: Central banks cannot control inflation on their own? Cochrane: No. Inflation is always and everywhere a joint problem of monetary, fiscal and, to some extent, microeconomic policy. The central bank is powerful. It can affect the time path of inflation. But if the government doesn’t have the resources to pay its bills, either now or credibly in the future, there’s going to be inflation. Valor: Why? Cochrane: That’s because money is ultimately like stock in the government. Money and government debt are sort of the same thing: government debt is just a promise of more money in the future. So if people are holding government debt or money and don’t have faith that the government has the ability to soak up too much money in the future, you’re going to get inflation no matter what the central bank does. The central bank then has the power to affect the timing. It can produce less inflation now and more inflation in the future. But it can’t stop inflation without the underpinnings of fiscal policy. Valor: Recent episodes in Brazil show that the adoption of fiscal rules considered credible by market participants improved expectations and current inflation… Cochrane: This fits into the historical pattern. The U.S. has all sorts of beautiful budget rules that we just ignore. You have to have budget rules that people think are going to be followed. So you solve this long-run fiscal problem, and inflation can stop on a dime. Then interest rates can go down and money growth can increase, because you’ve solved the underlying problem. Valor: We saw a hawkish speech by Kevin Warsh at Jackson Hole. Would raising interest rates in the U.S. without a fiscal adjustment be advisable? Cochrane: The best models I have now say that, yes, higher interest rates can lower inflation, but only temporarily. And they make inflation worse later on [because of the fiscal deterioration caused by higher interest rates]. The central bank can do some good temporarily, but then things get worse. So, in the end, why am I not writing in huge letters, “Kevin [Warsh], raise interest rates and stop inflation”? It’s not so clear that he’s going to be able to do that all alone. It would, I think, bring inflation down in the short run, but potentially at the cost of making it worse in the long run. That can buy fiscal policy some space, but it can also reduce the pressure to fix fiscal policy. Valor: That is an unconventional view... Cochrane: I’m grateful not to have his job because I can be wrong. The difference between an academic and a central banker is that I can be wrong. My job is to be outlandish and hope that I’m right. His job is: don’t screw up. Valor: How do you view the recent rise in long-term interest rates in the U.S.? Cochrane: I’ve been saying, repent. Solve deficit, inflation is coming. I’ve been saying that for 30 years. Why am I not back on the street corner with a sign about it? There are many stories about this. One of them is that bondholders are finally coming to their senses and saying, “These guys are not going to pay it back.” That has been one of the puzzles of the past 30 years: horrible deficit projections, and yet very low interest rates. Valor: Is it essentially a credibility problem? Cochrane: Our institutions [in the U.S.] are not looking very good. Our ability to commit to things that last over generations, like paying back the debt, being kind to our allies, or maintaining a consistent foreign policy for more than a week or two, is fraying. And those are the things that, in the long run, underpin the faith behind no inflation. So that faith could finally be evaporating. Valor: Is a crisis coming? Cochrane: That’s the common story: here comes the global debt crisis. Bondholders see the end coming and want to get out first. It’s worth noting that the only [Western] country whose interest rates are not going up is one that is still paying 1% interest: Switzerland. They have great fiscal policy. That kind of points to the FTPL. But I also think 5% [on the 10-year rate] isn’t the end of the world. In Brazil, you must be laughing at the American press that sees interest rates of 5.5% and thinks the world is ending. Valor: Is the rise in U.S. interest rates also partly due to higher real interest rates? Cochrane: Yes. Embedded inflation expectations are very low. If you look at actual interest rates versus inflation-indexed bonds, that’s not showing high inflation expectations. So that works against the global debt crisis. Maybe it’s just back to normal. For thousands of years, we had 2% inflation, 3% real interest rates and 5% long-term interest rates. Valor: Could the move in long-term rates be happening for a good reason? Cochrane: If you suddenly discover that artificial intelligence is going to dramatically raise productivity, then interest rates need to go up. That reflects, in technical terms, a higher marginal product of capital. Maybe we’re just seeing high real interest rates because it’s back to normal and, finally, we’re back to growth. I’ve just given you about five possible answers. I don’t know which one is the right answer. Valor: Could the rise in long-term rates trigger a debt crisis? Cochrane: There is a global sovereign debt crisis out there. I don’t know that this is the moment when it’s going to blow up, but, like all crises, it needs a spark. What worries me is when the next crisis comes and all of our countries say they need to borrow another $5 trillion. That could be the spark that breaks it. Valor: Governments have shown a greater willingness to shorten the maturity of their debt. How do you assess that? Cochrane: I was pounding my fist on the table that the U.S. should lengthen the maturity structure of the debt during the era of very low interest rates. Now we’re on the opposite end. Yes, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is now buying long-term debt and issuing short-term debt. Valor: Is it a bet by the Treasury? Cochrane: A more sympathetic reading is that, if Bessent really thinks that interest rates and inflation are going to fall a lot, it would make sense to get out of long-term debt. You buy back your long-term debt at a very low price, shorten the debt, and when rates come down, the interest costs of the debt evaporate. So maybe that’s what’s going on. Having that much faith in your own propaganda—sorry, in your own economic policy prescriptions—is dangerous. Valor: Is that risky? Cochrane: We’re back to the debt-crisis story: bond markets start saying there’s a problem, and then they start demanding a higher premium—a default premium, an inflation premium, a risk premium—to lend money over the long term. They’re still willing to lend short-term because they think they can get out before everything blows up. You, as a government or company, don’t think you’re going bankrupt. So faced with the choice between financing at very high long-term rates or low short-term rates, you say, “Okay, we’ll go with the short-term rates because it’s cheaper.” A very common pattern throughout history is that governments, businesses and banks, as they get closer and closer to bankruptcy, end up borrowing at increasingly shorter maturities. So the least charitable interpretation of the U.S. moving toward short-term debt is: the end is coming. Valor: Supply shocks are often blamed for higher inflation. What is their relevance from the perspective of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level? Cochrane: Faced with inflation, our politicians never want to acknowledge that it’s too much money chasing too few goods, or too much government debt without a plan to pay it back. That’s a very inconvenient answer to “Where does inflation come from?” So they say it was supply shocks. A supply shock is a change in relative prices. If there’s a frost and all the oranges freeze, the price of oranges goes up. Is that inflationary? No. It means the price of oranges goes up relative to the price of other things. It’s a relative price change. Inflation isn’t about one thing relative to another. It’s about everything going up at the same time. It’s a fundamental economic mistake to say inflation comes from the sum of relative prices. It’s like pulling yourself up by your bootstraps. Valor: Does an increase in the price level have to come from monetary and fiscal policy? Cochrane: Yes. A supply shock can generate, loosely speaking, a situation in which some prices rise faster than other prices fall. So relative price shocks can induce some inflation for a while, but it goes away. The crucial feature of the inflation we saw in 2021 and 2022 was that the price level did not come back down again. If the price of oil goes up, if supply-chain prices go up, we need to have the money to buy the more expensive oil and everything else at the same price. If we don’t have more money, the price of oil goes up, but the money we used to spend on that has to drive down the price of everything else. So the only way all prices can go up is if someone gives us more money to pay the higher prices for everything. The problem, at bottom, is fiscal. Valor: The composition of Brazil’s debt has deteriorated in recent years. Could that have negative implications, in your view? Cochrane: Yes, this is an important point. Fiscal theory points to the importance of the choice of debt maturity structure, the currency in which it is denominated, and whether it is indexed or not. If you choose to borrow indexed debt or foreign-currency debt, inflation no longer gets rid of part of the real value of your debt. So if you can’t pay your debts—or if you choose not to pay them—the process becomes much more painful. You have to formally default and face the consequences in financial markets. Valor: In Brazil, the term “fiscal dominance” appears frequently in the news. Is it a useful concept? Cochrane: I hate that term because, like many terms in economics—“savings glut,” “global imbalance,” “liquidity”—nobody knows what the hell they’re talking about. In Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, fiscal policy is always the crucial ingredient. But good fiscal policy means no inflation. Most people who talk about “fiscal dominance” are referring only to a situation where fiscal policy is out of control and inflation is also out of control. Valor: Brazil will hold elections in the coming months, and both candidates are expected to present proposals to address the public debt problem. Could such a message help inflation? Cochrane: A good solution to the public debt problem would help inflation. A bad solution—incredible promises like “we’re going to subsidize this, we’re going to subsidize that”—would cause all sorts of problems. Nobody believes it, and it’s not going to work. The solutions are obvious and well known, but they’re not the sort of things candidates want to say until the situation gets bad enough and people can no longer tolerate inflation. And when that happens, they’re willing to accept changes. But it doesn’t have to be painful. Valor: Do you have any suggestions? Cochrane: If I were a candidate—although you’re about to find out why I’ll never be elected to anything—I think the right message would not be austerity, but reform. Economics offers a way out of the classic left-right divide. It’s about paying attention to incentives. A well-designed reform allows for a macroeconomically painless outcome. Valor: What is the role of growth in the entire discussion? Cochrane: Microeconomic growth is the answer to all wounds. All successful liberalizations combine better fiscal policy, better monetary policy, microeconomic growth, and strong institutions that ensure that we really will repay the debt. That means, for example, a constitutional debt limit and a budget law, as exists in the U.S., that we actually pay attention to. When I think about Brazil’s opportunities, I see a path through microeconomic deregulation. You don’t have to invent anything new. You just have to be only as dysfunctional as the United States, and you can get to a much higher GDP per capita. I mean that in terms of property rights, the rule of law, regulation, and all the things we know.