美巴关系趋冷波及中资，前外交官吁在巴企业提升投资能见度

Kellie Meiman Hock Divulgação After three decades working on relations between the United States and Latin America, particularly Brazil, former U.S. diplomat Kellie Meiman Hock, who served in São Paulo, Recife, and Porto Alegre, sees a “new dynamic” in the Trump administration’s interactions with other governments in the Americas—one not seen since the “highly interventionist” policies of the Cold War. A professor of international trade at Georgetown University in Washington, co-director at the Inter-American Dialogue, and senior advisor at McLarty Associates, Meiman has been approached by businesspeople and executives seeking help navigating instability in Brazil-U.S. relations. She believes the private sector must work to raise the profile of Brazilian investment in the United States and convince the American public of the interdependence between the two economies. The bilateral relationship is going through a difficult period, she said, but there is an opportunity to rebuild trust. Meiman views the personal rapport between President Lula and President Donald Trump as a positive development. She also sees the potential for a “win-win” agreement on critical minerals. According to the former diplomat, the United States has little understanding of Brazil’s multilateral approach, which seeks to engage with other countries “without making enemies.” In a video interview with Valor from Washington, the consultant said the U.S. political establishment does not appreciate the scale of Chinese investment in Brazil. She highlighted the Lula administration’s and Mercosur’s appetite for expanding trade with the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. “It took Trump to turn Lula into a free-trade advocate,” she said. Below are the main excerpts from her interview with Valor: Valor: In your experience as a diplomat and consultant, have you ever seen a more challenging or volatile situation than the current one? Kellie Meiman Hock: I am not going to discuss the period of military rule—that was another chapter in our history. Since Brazil returned to democracy with the 1988 Constitution, the current phase of the bilateral relationship has truly been one of the most difficult. But it is important to remember that Brazil is not alone. Canada has been a U.S. ally in many wars, and the two economies are deeply integrated. Yet, their relationship is going through an equally difficult, if not more difficult, period. It is important to keep that perspective. Valor: This period has been marked by efforts by the Trump administration—and Secretary of State Marco Rubio in particular—to influence politics in Latin American countries. Nicolás Maduro was ousted in Venezuela, and there has also been influence in Colombia and Argentina. Meiman: And in Honduras. Valor: How does that affect bilateral relations? Meiman: This dynamic is new, except during the Cold War, when U.S. foreign policy was highly interventionist. Since the end of the Cold War, after the Berlin Wall fell [in 1989], and while I was in the diplomatic service, we were always told not to comment on elections in the countries where we were serving. I remember very clearly when Victor Manuel Rocha was U.S. ambassador to Bolivia [from 2000 to 2002]. He said that “the Bolivian people should not vote for Evo Morales.” That produced what became known as the “Rocha effect,” and Morales was elected president [in 2005]. Many years later, it emerged that Manuel Rocha was an agent of Cuba [in 2024, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison]. As a student of U.S.-Latin American relations, I often think people have failed to study the Manuel Rocha episode properly, because when the United States supports a candidate, the effect in many countries—including Brazil—is often the opposite. It has worked in some cases, but it is complicated. The outcome is not linear. Valor: President Lula has invoked national sovereignty to oppose the tariff increases, which have been interpreted as indirect support for presidential candidate Flávio Bolsonaro. Has the relationship between the two countries been poisoned? How can businesses navigate and operate amid such instability? Meiman: Public opinion is a major challenge. We are going through such a turbulent period here in the United States, with so much happening, that it is very difficult to pay attention to everything. Investors in Brazil and communities that depend on Brazilian investment, supplies, and imports for their businesses are naturally paying close attention and are very concerned. I would say that Brazilian companies investing and creating jobs in the United States have a duty to make that contribution much more visible. They must raise the profile of Brazilian investment, Brazilian capital, Brazilian companies, and U.S. companies working with Brazilian businesses. Their profile is not high enough to create a support base. It is complicated. There is a great deal of noise in Washington right now, and I am not suggesting that this will be easy. Valor: Exemptions from the sweeping tariff increases have been negotiated. How could further progress be made? Meiman: Most of those exemptions were granted because of the impact on U.S. inflation—for orange juice, tropical fruit, and coffee—or because Brazilian companies with investments in the United States did a good job of explaining the interdependence between our countries. It is helpful that many Brazilian investments are in Florida. Marco Rubio [the descendant of Cubans whose electoral base is in Florida] may take a very hard line toward Brazil. But other important members of Trump’s cabinet also come from Florida, including Susie Wiles [the White House chief of staff]. In my view, this has much more to do with ideology, the secretary of state’s position on Cuba, and the Brazilian left’s historical relationship with Cuba. Valor: Is U.S. action in Cuba expected in the coming months? Meiman: No one knows. There are only a lot of rumors and gossip. Valor: Brazil’s ambassador in Washington, Maria Luiza Viotti, had her visa revoked, while Daniel Perez [a Republican lawmaker and speaker of the Florida House of Representatives], whom the U.S. government nominated for the ambassadorial post in Brasília, has yet to receive agrément from the Lula administration. How do you think this impasse will be resolved? Do you see an electoral component? Meiman: It is a highly unusual and tense situation. On the U.S. side, the Senate has already confirmed Daniel Perez. As for Brazil, I am not Brazilian and should not comment, but I imagine October will be very important. Given some of the U.S. government’s comments, I would not be surprised if Brazil waited before approving his nomination. When I worked in the U.S. diplomatic service, we knew that Itamaraty had a reputation—not only in the bilateral relationship but globally—for being deeply committed to protocol. The U.S. diplomatic corps does not receive training as rigorous as what the Rio Branco Institute provides. Brazilian diplomats receive top-notch preparation and have a reputation for strict adherence to protocol. Valor: You are referring to the fact that the United States did not consult Brazil before announcing Daniel Perez’s nomination as ambassador, correct? That is required by diplomatic protocol. Meiman: I can imagine that kind of mistake occurring even if Trump were not president. Many things in U.S. politics are unique to Trump, but this is not one of them. I understand the confusion it created and, as someone who wants the bilateral relationship to be productive, I hope the issue can be resolved soon. The rapport between the two leaders is a positive aspect of an otherwise challenging relationship, as demonstrated by the recent telephone conversation between Presidents Trump and Lula. We will be watching their interaction closely at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly [on the 22nd in New York]. Valor: Brazil’s reserves of critical industrial minerals and rare earths are of interest to the United States. Brazil wants to process those resources domestically. How do you think the negotiations will unfold? Meiman: This is a very important issue, and I see considerable opportunity here. The Brazilian government is now seeking not only to extract these minerals but also to process them. Although the United States also wants to process them, doing so is complicated and polluting. I understand that Brazil is committed to doing this in an environmentally responsible manner, which makes complete sense and has always been a commitment, at least under the Lula administration. We are having a very intense political debate in the United States over data centers. Imagine if we launched initiatives to process critical minerals [on U.S. soil], when we already know how difficult it is to do cleanly. Perhaps an agreement is not possible now, because any negotiation requires mutual trust, and the bilateral relationship is going through a difficult period. If trust is restored over the next five or ten years, I still see opportunities for a “win-win” agreement [in which both parties benefit]—one under which processing would take place in Brazil, but with allies involved. From a national security perspective, there is an opportunity there. Valor: China has the largest reserves, so it is the United States that needs allies, correct? Meiman: Not many people here in the United States understand Brazil well. Brazil is a vast, complex country, with many political parties and significant regional differences. I therefore always try to explain to the people I speak with how Brazil conducts its global relations in an entirely multilateral way. I am not referring to the multilateral system; I mean being multilateral. Brazil aims to engage with every country. Being allied with one does not prevent it from being allied with another. The approach is essentially: “I will maintain relations with several countries and engage with each of them in accordance with Brazil’s interests.” Brazil tries not to make enemies. In my view, that makes Brazil a reliable source of resources. But the country has a history of protectionism in certain areas. I worked with ethanol throughout my career, and I have the scars from negotiations over that and other trade issues. Bilateral trade relations clearly have their complications. Valor: One of Brazil’s complaints is that the U.S. government wants a privileged position as its preferred partner, even though countries—including Brazil—have diversified their trade relationships. Trade with China has grown exponentially in recent years. Meiman: It has grown particularly rapidly in Brazil. To be honest, concern about China’s activities in the Americas is not limited to Trump. It exists on both the Republican and Democratic sides, and I would say it extends to the American public. We are even seeing it in the review of the agreement with Mexico and Canada. Everyone [in the United States] is concerned that China may be trying to use trade with countries neighboring the United States to access the U.S. market, now that we have a tariff wall against China. It is important to distinguish what is specific to the Trump administration from what reflects a broader concern—to consider which issues will remain on the table regardless of who wins the U.S. midterm elections or Brazil’s presidential election. The situation parallels—but differs from—the opportunities involving Canada. I find it frustrating because Brazil and Canada are the two countries the United States should be seeking cooperation with on critical minerals and rare earths. Yet, our relationships with both are currently strained. Valor: Are Trump’s sweeping tariffs pushing countries toward closer relations with China? Meiman: With China and with other countries. The running joke among those of us who have worked on bilateral trade for decades is: “It took Trump to turn Lula into a free-trade advocate.” The Mercosur-European Union agreement was finally concluded, and negotiations are underway with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates. This highly ambitious trade agenda demonstrates Brazil’s and Mercosur’s willingness to engage with the world. This is a unique moment. The U.S. political establishment does not fully appreciate the extent of Chinese investment in Brazil. Once a broader audience in Washington and across the United States understands it, charting a path forward will become more difficult. Valor: Another controversial issue is regulating digital platforms and Big Tech companies. What does the United States expect from Brazil on this issue, and how does it fit into the tariff debate? Meiman: This is an extremely important issue for the current U.S. administration. As for digital platforms, we do not even have a domestic consensus on how to regulate them. These issues will not be resolved easily. Views vary widely on how we should address the challenge and define what constitutes freedom of speech and what constitutes dangerous speech—not to mention how we handle it in our relations not only with Brazil, but also with Canada, the European Union, and Australia. It remains unresolved. Translation: Todd Harkin