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巴西央行前行长加入美联储工作组,前瞻指引策略或影响中资信贷成本

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Brazil’s Central Bank caught between Delphi and Ulysses

巴西央行前行长弗拉加加入美联储工作组评估沟通策略,其结论可能影响巴西央行未来利率指引方式。当前Selic利率14.25%高位下,央行倾向“德尔斐式”指引而非硬性承诺,中资企业在巴融资成本与信贷条件可能因此面临更长期的不确定性。

为什么值得关注

巴西央行沟通策略选择直接影响14.25%高利率环境下的信贷条件与长期融资成本,中资制造业、基建企业首当其冲。

巴西央行前行长阿米尼奥·弗拉加(Arminio Fraga)将加入美联储主席凯文·沃什(Kevin Warsh)组建的工作组,协助评估美联储的货币政策框架及沟通策略。该工作组的结论可能对巴西央行(BCB)有直接参考价值——后者正面临类似的前瞻指引策略抉择。巴西央行前经济政策主管法比奥·坎苏克(Fábio Kanczuk)在一份讨论文件中指出,“前瞻指引”实际包含两种工具:一是“尤利西斯式”指引,即央行对未来利率做出有约束力的承诺;二是“德尔斐式”指引,即央行分享经济展望但不做硬性承诺。当前巴西基准利率Selic为14.25%,坎苏克认为无需使用尤利西斯式工具,应深化德尔斐式指引。这一策略选择将直接影响在巴中资企业的信贷成本与长期融资条件。

巴西央行前行长阿米尼奥·弗拉加将加入美联储主席凯文·沃什组建的工作组,协助美联储评估其货币政策框架及沟通策略。该工作组的结论可能对巴西央行有参考价值,后者正面临类似问题。巴西央行前行长法比奥·坎苏克在一份讨论文件中指出,“前瞻指引”实际上包含两种不同工具:一是“尤利西斯式”指引,即央行像尤利西斯将自己绑在桅杆上一样,对未来利率做出有约束力的承诺,除非通胀或失业率等预设条件被触发;二是“德尔斐式”指引,即央行像德尔斐神谕一样分享对经济的解读和前景展望,但不做硬性承诺,飞行计划可根据天气变化调整。坎苏克认为,巴西央行应深化使用德尔斐式指引,但前提是市场足够成熟。当前巴西基准利率Selic为14.25%,无需使用尤利西斯式工具。巴西央行过去十年已大幅提高透明度,但部分经济学家认为其透明度过高反受其困。坎苏克指出,发布条件性预测模型并不等同于前瞻指引,模型依赖假设而非确定性,央行仍需大量判断,因此“条件性模型不消除自由裁量权,而是组织自由裁量权”。

对于在巴西经营的中资企业而言,巴西央行的沟通策略选择直接影响信贷市场预期。当前Selic利率14.25%已处于高位,若央行采用更明确的“尤利西斯式”承诺,可能短期内压低长期利率预期,降低企业融资成本;但若继续深化“德尔斐式”指引,利率路径将保持更大灵活性,中资企业在进行长期投资决策时需面对更高的利率不确定性。底稿未涉及中资企业直接影响的具体行业,但通过信贷条件与通胀预期机制间接传导:制造业、基建和农业等重资产行业对长期融资成本最为敏感,而贸易企业则更关注汇率波动与信贷可得性。巴西央行(BCB)是这一传导链条的核心监管机构,其沟通策略变化将影响所有在巴企业的资金成本。

CBI解读:底稿显示,巴西央行当前倾向于“德尔斐式”指引,即保持政策灵活性,不做出硬性利率承诺。CBI认为,这一选择在Selic利率14.25%的高位环境下具有合理性——硬性承诺可能限制央行应对突发通胀或外部冲击的能力。但CBI同时观察到,坎苏克强调“德尔斐式”指引的前提是市场足够成熟,而巴西金融市场深度与投资者成熟度仍低于发达经济体,这可能削弱指引的实际效果。横向对比,美联储在2013年“缩减恐慌”后逐步转向更明确的利率路径指引,而巴西央行若坚持德尔斐式路线,中资企业需自行承担更多利率预判工作。

待观察:1)弗拉加所在的美联储工作组何时发布评估结论,以及巴西央行是否会公开引用其建议;2)巴西央行下次货币政策会议(预计2025年5月)是否会调整沟通策略表述;3)Selic利率若出现下行拐点,央行是否会从德尔斐式转向更明确的承诺式指引。

CBI 观察编辑判断

事实:巴西央行倾向“德尔斐式”指引,不做硬性利率承诺。CBI认为,这在高利率环境下保留政策灵活性,但中资企业需自行承担更多利率预判风险,信贷成本不确定性上升。

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信息概要

类型
政策发布
方向
巴西
分类
宏观市场
层级
编辑整理
地点
在巴中资企业,特别是制造业、基建、农业及贸易企业
核验
待核验
对象
在巴中资企业金融机构投资者
话题
政策金融

来源信息

来源
Valor International
原文标题
Brazil’s Central Bank caught between Delphi and Ulysses
原始语言
英语
原文链接
查看原文 →
编辑
Clara Lin
查看原文(英语

Brazil’s Central Bank caught between Delphi and Ulysses

Former Brazilian Central Bank Chief Arminio Fraga will help the Federal Reserve review its communication strategy as part of a task force created by Fed Chair Kevin Warsh to assess the institution’s broader monetary-policy framework. Its conclusions may also prove useful to Brazil’s Central Bank, which has been wrestling with similar questions. A good starting point for that debate in Brazil is a discussion paper by Fábio Kanczuk, a former director of economic policy at the Central Bank. His view carries particular weight because he was at the helm the only time Brazil reached the lower limit for interest rates, during the pandemic, and had to rely on communication to meet the inflation target. Analysis: Inflation expectations offer Central Bank some relief despite rising pessimism Central Bank tries to fine-tune message to markets Kanczuk sees advantages in telling the market what the Central Bank intends to do in the future, but believes the tool should be used only when investors are mature enough to understand it. Before examining his argument, however, some context is needed. Communication and rates A central bank must communicate effectively because it controls only the very short-term interest rate—in Brazil, the benchmark Selic rate. Credit conditions and the broader economy, however, are driven by longer-term rates, which are determined by market forces. Warsh opposes extensive discussion of future policy intentions. His main criticism is that markets become overly dependent on central-bank signals and less willing to adjust interest rates themselves as economic conditions change. Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought. One favors a more guarded style, epitomized by former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in the 1990s. He once said that after taking office he had learned to speak with great incoherence. The other places greater emphasis on communicating future intentions, an approach associated with former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke. During periods of financial crisis, with interest rates close to zero, Bernanke had to become increasingly explicit about keeping rates low to prevent deflation. Two forms of guidance Kanczuk argues that the debate is particularly difficult because the term “forward guidance” is used to describe two different tools. The first follows the analogy of Ulysses, who in the Odyssey asks to be tied to the mast of his ship so that he will not succumb to the sirens’ song. In the same way, a central bank binds itself to a future interest-rate commitment and stays on that course unless a pre-established condition is met, such as inflation or unemployment crossing a certain threshold. That is precisely what Kanczuk did at the Central Bank in 2020, when further rate cuts were no longer possible without jeopardizing financial stability, even though additional stimulus was needed to meet the inflation target. With the Selic now at 14.25%, there would be no need for such a tool today. There is also a Greek analogy for the second type of forward guidance. At times, a central bank speaks like the Oracle of Delphi, sharing its interpretation of the economy and its outlook for the future. “Delphic guidance is not a mast,” Kanczuk said. “A flight plan can be changed—and should be changed when weather conditions change. The objective is not to promise that the aircraft will fly through a storm simply because the original route said it would.” Delphic signals This form of forward guidance is useful for two main reasons. First, it allows the Central Bank to influence the longer end of the market yield curve and, in turn, credit conditions. Second, it gives investors clues about how policymakers might respond to future developments. Over the past decade, the Brazilian Central Bank has become far more transparent. It has published its inflation-forecasting models in detail and provided greater insight into its assessment of economic scenarios and the risks ahead. Some economists believe it has gone so far that it has become trapped by its own transparency. Kanczuk argues that publishing a forecasting model is not the same as offering forward guidance and therefore does not restrict the Central Bank’s discretion. One feature that is sometimes overlooked is that the model is conditional. It relies on inputs that are assumptions rather than certainties, including the exchange rate, commodity prices, regulated prices, external conditions and fiscal policy. Policymakers must also decide which shocks are temporary and which are persistent. The process involves a considerable degree of judgment. The Central Bank must constantly weigh its baseline scenario against numerous alternatives. “A conditional model does not eliminate discretion,” Kanczuk said. “It organizes discretion.” Market maturity For the former Central Bank director, the relevant question is not exactly whether forward guidance is good or bad. It is whether the institution should deepen its use of Delphic guidance. The answer, he argues, depends on whether the market is mature enough to distinguish between a central bank tying itself to the mast and one merely presenting a flight plan. When investors fail to understand the difference, the institution’s credibility may suffer. One curious point, not addressed in the paper, is that the Central Bank under Gabriel Galípolo has recently come under criticism for the opposite reason: the market wanted it to behave like Ulysses when, at most, it could offer only a faded image of Delphi.

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